This is a report of the impact of the ice storm that struck eastern Canada on 04-09 January 1998. The storm deposited ice some 100 mm thick on the ground and on the electric power lines and eventually left 1.4 million households and much of the infrastructure without electrical power.
The Event
The effects of global warming and weather phenomena such as El Nino and La Nina have been discussed frequently in recent years. In particular, this is true of El Nino, caused by intensive warm water currents from the equator in the Pacific Ocean that move towards the coasts approximately every six to eight years. This weather phenomenon has been implicated for some of the frequent natural catastrophes experienced in recent times, especially during 1997 and 1998, including the ice storm described in this report.
Although people in Canada had experienced shorter periods of freezing rain previously, 04 January 1998 saw the beginning of a virtually continuous downpour of freezing rain Riddex et al that lasted for several days.lt left the ground covered with thick sheets of ice. In the worst affected regions, the thickness of the ice on the ground was >100 mm, and the ice layer on overhead electric cables was estimated to be as much as 40 mm-50 mm in radius. This nearly doubled the weight of the lines. Furthermore, winds increased the movements of the cables that, in turn, caused many large pylons to break. The electricity grid was gradually worn down over a few days and by 09 January, about 1.4 million households, or approximately three million people were without electricity.
Most residents, along with local government agencies, initially had problems assessing the degree of seriousness of the situation, since the weather was expected to normalise within the coming days, and consequently, the power cuts would be temporary. Therefore, the Provincial Government never declared the situation a state of emergency or a disaster, which later had legal consequences regarding insurance matters. Without prior warning, many people had to wait several weeks during the harsh Canadian winter before their electricity supply was restored.
The situation demonstrated the extent to which we are dependent on electricity. Vital infrastructure along with production, warehousing, energy distribution and heating, hospitals and other health institutions, food production and the supply of clean water, telecommunications, information technology, the transportation of people and goods, banking and financial systems all were affected. Early on, the Provincial Government's Catastrophe Committee and the electric power company involved, Hydro Quebec, had to prioritise to which part of the infrastructure the electricity first needed to be restored. Additional areas of priority were health care institutions followed by emergency services and communication centres, shelters for those forced to leave their homes, and other organisations with any sort of humanitarian or social work.
Effect on Households, and Medical Services
The power cuts virtually paralysed most equipment necessary to run a household. An enormous demand arose for power generators fuelled by petrol or diesel. The Provincial Government set up a co-ordination centre that worked around the clock to prioritise, organise, distribute, and supervise the use of these power generators. Nevertheless, demand was greater than supply, and theft of generators occurred, though the overall crime rate during this period declined. Other sources of energy, such as wood, could be utilised, largely due to the large number of fallen trees that had to be removed. Despite these extra energy sources, many were unable to remain in their homes, and 25-56% of the inhabitants, depending on region, were forced to move. The majority of these inhabitants were able to move in with relatives or acquaintances, but 4-5% of the population, or approximately 140,000 people, were forced to spend at least one night in one of the 454 emergency shelters that the disaster organisation had established. Initially, some problems arose in these centres with complaints regarding sanitary conditions, facilities for the handicapped and elderly, and promiscuity.
Hospitals and smaller medical centres were given first priority as regards to the restoration of normal power. However, the hospitals already were equipped with emergency generators before the crisis to ensure that adequate care could be given to the emergency cases. Even in the regions where power was cut off for a longer period of time, the hospitals were able to care adequately for acutely injured people in the emergency departments. In order to maintain this service, other hospital services had to be cut down to a minimum, which, amongst other things, meant that elective surgery was stopped, and certain power consuming examinations and treatments were postponed. At certain hospitals, staff were invited to have their family live with them at the hospital enabling staff to be available more easily at all times. This was necessary especially in the worst affected regions where a larger than normal number of persons were brought to the emergency departments. Above all, there was a large increase in the number of people who sought medical attention for injuries sustained. Furthermore, there was an increase in the number of respiratory tract infections and heart problems amongst incoming patients. Faulty use of a petrol or diesel generators also caused a greater number of cases of carbon monoxide poisoning. Of these, six persons died and 50 required hyperbaric oxygen therapy.
As opposed to the large hospitals, some of the longterm care centres as well as district and private medical clinics were without power for several days, partly due to the lack of emergency generators. In some instances, patients had to be moved to larger hospitals or to emergency shelters. Physicians and nurses from closed medical climes to some extent, could provide health care in the different shelters, but a certain underutilisation of primary health institutions was observed.
Prehospital medical services were used heavily during the period. The need for ambulance transport increased markedly as these were used not only for medical emergencies, but also as means of transport for people to get to the various emergency shelters, as well as for transportation of medicines and other medical equipment. At the same time, the roads were hazardous and communications by telephone and radio were poor or completely cut off. Because of this, the co-ordination of these transports shifted, and eventually military transports also were used. Fatigue became evident amongst ambulance personnel.
There also was a risk that the water supply would be cut off due to failure of water pumps and waterworks. Some 100 municipalities were affected for a time period of a few hours, as power could be restored by use of emergency generators connected to the stations. The larger health risks caused by unsafe drinking water were not reported.
The handling of information during the crisis was the responsibility of each separate municipality with some support from the Ministry of the Interior. According to the disaster plans in the Provinces, the essential task was to inform the public about current events, risks, communication problems, and which measures should be undertaken by individuals and by the municipality itself. Despite large differences in the municipalities prior to the emergency, in general, information proved to be hampered by limited resources and the fact that the administrations themselves were affected. Furthermore, some of the information was 52 KAMEDO Report No. 74 transmitted via television, which only could be watched by people supplied with electricity, and hence, the local radio channel probably should have been utilised to a greater extent. Much of the information that was passed on to the public also was affected by rumours, which in turn, led to the distribution of misleading or incorrect information.
Discussion
Electricity and telephone services have become indispensable to the extent that people nowadays consider them to be necessities. In recent years, we have seen information technology develop with a similar result. Increased demand for power supplies has created a dependency that has developed into a new vulnerability. A hundred years ago, people had not been affected in the same way or to the same degree by a similar weather situation.
Better emergency plans must be developed in order to avoid different types of power and communication failures and to keep pace with technological advances. For example, the same apprehension that was evident for the Y2K computer bug could be projected to many of the other vital structures in society. For every essential infrastructure, there exists a need for security systems to be continually redeveloped.
During the ice storm in Quebec, the hospitals' emergency care could adequately readjust to the increased number of patients. To offer accommodation, food, and heating to hospital staff with families was an effective solution to ensure an adequate hospital workforce. Despite some hospitals having longer power outages, emergency examinations, treatments, and operations could be performed. However, an increase in the number and capacity of emergency generators built into hospitals could improve the situation during periods of extended power failure and even could allow hospital routines to continue as usual.
The ice storm affected emergency medical care significantly as the population involved changed their behaviour markedly. An increase in deaths and serious injuries occurred when attempts were made to remove the ice sheets from buildings and especially roofs.
Also, an increase in the number of persons with carbon monoxide poisoning was noted, caused by the incorrect use of alternative energy sources, usually without ventilation. Despite attempts to distribute information early regarding certain health risks, the entire population could not be reached. An aim for the future is to improve the use of warning texts and signs on energy aggregates. The lack of heating in houses did not prevent part of the population from remaining at home throughout the ice storm. In total, six people died from hypothermia during the period.
Primary medical care centres in Quebec should play a greater role in the future than they did during the ice storm, and thus, take some of the pressure off of the hospitals. Furthermore, emergency generators should be stored at smaller hospitals and medical centres as well as at district general practitioners' surgeries and private medical institutions. The district surgeries, whose electricity supplies were restored early in the crisis, were able to take the pressure off of the emergency departments at the hospitals effectively.
Home-care during the crisis had difficulties in identifying and locating all of the people who were subjected to the storm. Therefore, many home-care patients were helped to hospitals, mostly by relatives or friends. An increase of primary care resources for registering and helping these patients is required. Improved co-ordination between medical services and the social services in Quebec also needs to be established. Ambulance medical care showed deficiencies in terms of following pre-arranged disaster plans. Extended disaster training should be carried out by ambulance staff. There also exists a need for finding an emergency communication system, when the regular telephone net breaks down or is overloaded.
According to public opinion, the provision of regular and adequate information is one of the most important tasks of the authorities. Despite certain understanding of the gravity of the situation and the difficulties in estimating and spreading available information, many people felt stressed, as they were unable to forecast how their situation would develop. Due to language problems, some of the immigrant population were not able to receive the available information.
Successful disaster preparedness demands continuous work on both decision-making and executive levels. It is vital that the affected authorities make themselves aware of all old and new risks that a society could be subjected to, and that this knowledge also is forwarded to the public. Disaster plans that are worked out must be revised continuously, and most importantly, if they are to be followed adequately, transformed into regular drills.
Conclusions
The effects of the ice storm exposed several weaknesses of a modern society extremely dependent on electric power. Although enormous resources were mobilised to re-establish electric power and to maintain all vital functions, the ice storm in Canada also demonstrated several deficiencies in the disaster preparedness of the Quebec provinces. However, when the plans were no longer sufficient, the affected populations showed a considerable capacity to solve problems as they arose and, above all, increased solidarity.
